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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
statement of the Problem
 
Court reform is a growing national priority. The overwhelm­
ing number of litigants populating American courtrooms today has 
placed a serious burden upon judicial institutions to produce 
well-thought, reasoned decisions in light of a rapidly increasing 
caseload. This caseload growth has restricted judges from fully 
effectuating their duties. Consequently, efforts to accommodate 
the growing demand for judicial services reflect a deviation from 
the traditional role and responsibilities of the American judge. 
For the United states judicial system, such a departure from 
tradition has dangerous and potentially irreversible implica­
tions. Immediate action must be taken to prevent any serious 
ramifications from arising. 
Purpose of the study 
It is the purpose of this study to examine the nature, the 
scope and the consequences of the caseload problem as well as the 
attempts which have been made to improve the situation. Addi­
tionally, a proposal based on the research findings of this paper 
will be advanced in an attempt to alleviate the caseload dilemma. 
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Scope of the Study 
It is the intention of this study to deal exclusively with 
the federal appellate level. Two reasons exist. First, the 
federal appellate courts, in particular the Courts of Appeals, 
have been affected the most by the caseload growth. Second, the 
function of the appellate courts is distinct from that of the 
district courts and needs to be preserved. Appellate process 
requires time for research, reflection and the writing of opin­
ions. In order for these conditions to remain, the proper 
environment must exist. The rising number of cases filed annual­
ly at the appellate level increases judicial workload and subse­
quently threatens this ideal environment. Since the appellate 
level is the final stage in the litigation process, the need ~or 
quality and confidence in judicial services is of extreme impor­
tance. For these reasons, the scope of this study will focus 
solely on the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 
Limitations of the Study 
The majority of the data obtained for this study carne 
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
Although some of the data was easily accessible, statistics 
concerning more specialized information were more difficult to 
obtain. Consequently, analysis of the data may be restricted to 
specific time periods because of limited access to information. 
3 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined to facilitate understanding 
of the subject matter: 
Case Filing: Any action that is reported as filed, terminated or 
pending in the Administrative Office of the United states Courts. 
For this study, case filings will be assessed on a per year basis 
where "year" refers to the appellate court term from September 
until July. 
In Forma Pauperis: Describes permission given to an indigent to 
proceed without liability for court fees or cost. 1 
Jurisdiction: The power of a court to hear and to determine a 
judicial proceeding. 2 
Writ of Certiorari: An order which has the effect of ordering 
the lower court to certify the record and to send it up to the 
higher court which has used its discretion to hear the appeal. 3 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 
Introduction 
The foundation of the federal court system resides in 
Article III, Section I of the United States Constitution which 
mandates that the judicial power of the Federal Government shall 
be vested in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.,,4 
This constitutional authorization for Congress to develop and to 
shape the judicial branch of the federal government has been 
instrumental in creating and in attempting to maintain a func~ 
tional and effective federal court system. Accordingly, changes 
in the court system's structure and jurisdiction have occurred. 
Structural Development 
Today, federal judicial power is not only vested in one 
supreme court but also in several inferior appellate and trial 
tribunals. Structurally, the present United States court system 
resembles a pyramid. At the apex, there exists the Supreme 
Court, the highest tribunal in the United states which consists 
of eight associate justices and one chief justice. The United 
states Courts of Appeals preside immediately below the Supreme 
4
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Court with each court occupying one of thirteen circuits. Eleven 
circuits are organized on a regional basis where each encompasses 
three or more states. The District of Columbia has exclusive 
jurisdiction for its district. Finally, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, located in Washington, D.C., has unique 
jurisdiction and is not regional in nature. Between six and 
twenty-eight judges are assigned to a circuit depending upon the 
amount and the complexity of judicial work involved. S Overall, 
there are presently 156 circuit judges within the twelve courts 
of appeals and an additional twelve in the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit. 6 Below the.courts of appeals are ninety­
four district courts where cases are originally heard and decid­
ed. Eighty-nine of those courts are located in the fifty states 
and the other five exist in the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
Today, there are 575 district judgeships authorized by law.? 
A series of legislative enactments has transformed the 
federal judiciary into the complex, three-tiered system that it 
is today. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was the first major legisla­
tive proposal concerning the judicial branch to be approved by 
the First Congress. This act established two tiers of inferior 
courts to exist and to function below the Supreme Court. The 
district courts were designated as exclusive trial courts whereas 
the intermediate circuit courts, composed of two Supreme Court 
justices and one district judge, were given trial and appellate 
responsibilities. S Since the circuits were organized on a geo­
6 
graphical basis, the concept of "circuit-riding" evolved as the 
justices traveled great distances to preside over their 
designated circuits. 
The majority of legislation has been directed at the 
creation and the reform of the middle tier. 9 Until technology 
shortened the time involved in traveling, congressional reform of 
the court system was based solely on mitigating the travel 
burdens imposed on the circuit-riders. For instance, Congress 
restructured the circuit courts so as to only require a panel of 
one justice and one district judge. IO Congress also opted to 
expand the membership of the Supreme Court. ll Originally, Con­
gress resisted such a measure, but as the double duty of circuit­
riding and of presiding on the Supreme Court became increasingly 
burdensome and as western expansion necessitated the creation Qf 
new circuits, this type of reform was inevitable. 
From 1870 to 1891 such factors as geographical expansion, 
population growth, commercial development and congressional 
extensions of federal jurisdiction precipitated a dramatic 
increase in federal litigation. Consequently, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act, traditionally known as the Evarts Act, was 
enacted. This act created a circuit court of appeals with 
appellate jurisdiction for each of the nine circuits and accord­
ingly provided for permanent court of appeals judgeships.12 
Although the circuit courts (as distinguished from the Courts of 
Appeals in the nine circuits) remained, further cHange was made 
in 1911 which completely abolished the circuit courts and trans­
•
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ferred their trial jurisdiction to the district courts. 13 Fi­
nally, in 1925, Congress expanded the Supreme Court's discretion 
over its docket. 14 Essentially, these legislative reforms 
created the present structure of the federal court system where 
the district courts have exclusive trial responsibilities, the 
Courts of Appeals exist for petitioners to assert their right of 
appeal and the Supreme Court exercises final review at its 
discretion on matters of public and national importance. 
Although the structure has not changed drastically since the 
early 1900s, modifications in the geographical design of the 
Courts of Appeals have occurred. In 1929, a tenth circuit was 
added. 15 Moreover, by implementing the 1948 Judicial Code, 
Congress created the District of Columbia circuit and technically 
renamed the Courts of Appeals circuits as the Courts of Appeals 
for the Various Circuits. 16 In 1981, the court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit was created,17 and the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal circuit was established in 1982 under the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act. 18 This circuit, merging the courts of 
customs, patents and claims appeals, is a specialized (rather 
than regional) court which handles all judicial business regard­
ing patents, trademarks, international trade, and claims against 
the federal government. 19 
•
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Jurisdictional Development 
Article III, section II of the United states Constitution 
broadly defines the federal court system's jurisdiction. That 
is, the United states courts can decide only those cases where 
the Constitution has given the courts the authority to do so. 
Accordingly, jurisdiction extends to those cases or controversies 
where the United states government is a party, where two or more 
states or citizens from different states are parties to an 
action, where ambassadors or other public ministers or consuls 
are involved, or where maritime and admiralty matters merit 
judicial attention. 20 
With respect to the Supreme Court, the Constitution grants 
original jurisdiction (the authority to consider and to decide 
cases in the first instance) as well as appellate jurisdiction 
(the authority to review a decision or judgment of an inferior 
tribunal and to affirm, reverse or modify the decision). Where 
cases or controversies involve ambassadors or other public 
ministers or consuls, the Supreme Court exercises original juris­
diction. In all other matters, the Supreme Court primarily has 
appellate jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that Congress can control the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by either expanding or 
limiting it. Indeed, the Constitution stipulates that the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is subject to congressional regula­
tions. 2l Therefore, no inherent right to control jurisdiction 
•
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belongs to the Court. Major legislative efforts modifying the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction include the Judiciary Act of 1925 
which greatly expanded the Court's power of discretion by replac­
ing mandatory appeals with petitions for certiorari and the 
Judiciary Act of 1928 which mandated that the sole method of 
mandatory review was in appeal form. More recently, in 1988 
Congress eliminated substantially all of the Supreme Court's 
mandatory, statutory-appeal jurisdiction. 22 
The Courts of Appeals for the First through the Eleventh 
Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit have regional 
jurisdiction. That is, they possess the authority to preside 
over all cases of any type in a specific region. Conversely, the 
Federal Circuit claims special jurisdiction, for it has the 
authority to consider and to rule on all cases of a particular 
type in the nation. The Courts of Appeals, having no power of 
discretion, must review all appeals that are filed. In contrast 
to the appellate jurisdiction of the intermediate courts and the 
Supreme Court, the district courts have exclusive original 
jurisdiction. 
Additions to the Federal Judicial Apparatus 
Certain institutions have recently been created to assist 
the Federal Judicial Branch in court administration, research and 
other responsibilities. The Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts performs many of the support functions of the 
•
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federal court system. Among its many responsibilities, the 
Administrative Office prepares and submits to Congress the budget 
and legislative agenda for the courts, provides administrative 
assistance to court personnel and clerical staffs, compiles and 
publishes statistics on the volume and distribution of the 
business of the courts and conducts research concerning court 
procedure and reform. 23 The United states Judicial Conference, 
the policy-making arm of the Federal Judiciary, consists of the 
Chief Justice of the United states, the Chief Judges of the 
Courts of Appeals and twelve district judges chosen for a three­
year term. Twice a year the Conference convenes and discusses 
administrative problems, policy issues and recommendations for 
legislation affecting the federal judicial system. 24 Finally, 
in 1968 Congress created the Federal Judicial Center to conduct 
research and training programs for judges and court personnel. 
Essentially, the Federal Judicial Center is the research and 
development arm of the Federal Judiciary.25 These institutions 
have proven to be valuable and effective adjuncts of the Federal 
Judicial Branch. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DILEMMA AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL 
Introduction 
The volume of case filings flooding the appellate level 
of the United states court system presents a dangerous predica­
ment. The function of the appellate courts is distinct from that 
of the trial courts. Indeed, the study Group on the Caseload of 
the Supreme Court emphasizes that the appellate function is a 
"process" over a period of time which resides "at the opposite 
pole from the 'processing' of cases in a high-speed, high volume 
enterprise [such as the district courts]. ,,26 In defining the 
role of the appellate courts, the Study Group asserts that the 
vital conditions for the discharge of the appellate level's 
responsibilities is "adequate time and ease of mind for research, 
reflection, [clarification] and consultation in reaching a judg­
ment. ,,27 The enormous increase in cas e f i 1ings compromises 
these indispensable conditions to the extent that the integrity 
of the appellate level and its work is jeopardized. This is the 
appellate dilemma. 
The inability of court authorities, scholars and researchers 
to establish definitive causes of the caseload growth further 
heightens the problem. Changes in the population, in legisla­
tion, in the size of the legal profession and in the social, 
11 
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economic and political environment have immensely affected the 
caseload growth. However, no specific source can be singled out 
as the primary cause of the caseload explosion. Court of Appeals 
Judge Richard Posner, author of The Federal Courts: Crisis and 
Reform, suggests that expanding the federal rights of an 
individual has a profound impact upon caseload growth. He 
remarks, "Increasing the number of potential claims by expanding 
an individual's federal rights has shifted the demand curve for 
the federal judicial services outward. ,,28 Such a claim would 
correspond with the litigation boom of the 1960s, a decade 
replete with federal civil rights legislation such as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and with court decisions supporting fundamen­
tal, individual rights such as Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) . 
Former Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the 
United States, Mark W. Cannon also theorizes as to causality. He 
contends that population growth has played a major role in the 
caseload increase. As people grow and develop into a complex 
society, more conflicts will arise resulting in litigation. 
Likewise, a change in the American public's attitude has oc­
curred. Americans seem more apt to turn to the courts as a first 
resort. Consequently, the federal judiciary many times must 
contend with frivolous litigation claims. 
A sudden and considerable growth in the legal profession in 
the 1970s has contributed to the mounting caseload. The emer­
gence of young, ambitious litigators accommodated and perpetuated 
13 
the high demand for litigation as opportunity for legal services 
increased. Also, a new emphasis in the law schools toward 
advocacy may have improved the problem of inadequate representa­
tion in the courtroom but also has boosted case filings as the 
young lawyers become more confident in their advocacy skills. 29 
with all of these factors influencing the American environ­
ment at different times, it is difficult to pinpoint one specific 
cause. Moreover, Richard Posner concludes that since no one 
seems to have a very clear idea of the causes of the caseload 
increase, it is extremely difficult to predict with any confi­
dence future growth and subsequently effective solutions. 30 
Thus, the recent efforts of researchers have been directed at 
surveying and analyzing the case filings of the federal courts in 
an attempt to locate specific, substantial areas of increase ~nd 
to proceed from there. 
Establishing the Caseload Increase 
The Supreme Court. Over the years, the Supreme Court's case 
filings have increased in number. During the early 1900s, annual 
filings were estimated at around 565 cases. By the middle of the 
1900s between 1,000 and 2,000 case filings were reported. 31 In 
1989, 5,000 cases were filed at the Supreme Court of which 63% 
came from the federal courts. 32 Thus, since the beginning of 
the 1900s, a considerable increase in case filings per year has 
occurred. Close analysis of this growth suggests a significant 
•
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rise in the percentage of annual filings in the 1960s, then a 
more constant percentage increase during the 1970s and the 1980s 
(See Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Table 1 
SUPREME COURT CASE FILINGS FROM 1920-1990 
YEAR ANNUAL CASE 
FILINGS 
PERCENTAGE OF 
INCREASE IN ANNUAL 
CASE FILINGS 
1920 565 --­
1930 1092 93% 
1940 1109 2% 
1950 1321 19% 
1960 2296 74% 
1970 3500 53% 
1980 4135 18% 
1990 5000 21% 
Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts 
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The Courts of Appeals. The increase in annual case filings for 
the Supreme Court, dramatic as it is, is dwarfed by the increase 
in the number of Courts of Appeals case filings. The Annual 
Report by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts reveals that for the 1989 term the Courts of 
Appeals received 34,995 case filings. 33 Again, a complete exam­
ination of the Courts of Appeals annual case filings from 1890­
1990 indicates a dramatic and continuous increase (See Table 2 
and Figure 2). In fact, within a ten-year span beginning in 
1960, case filings for the Courts of Appeals increased by 204 
percent. In comparison, examination of the decade prior to 1960 
revealed only a 41 percent increase whereas analysis of the 1940­
1950 era uncovers a 22 percent decrease in case filings. Addi­
tionally, in breaking down the case filings into their respective 
circuits, it is evident that over the past ten years the largest 
number of case filings has come from the Ninth and Fifth Circuits 
whereas the lowest number has emanated from the District of 
Columbia and the First Circuit (See Table 3). 
•
 
17 
Table 2 
CASE FILINGS FOR THE COURTS OF APPEALS FROM 1890-1990 
YEAR CASE 
FILINGS 
PERCENTAGE 
INCREASE 
NUMBER OF 
JUDGES 
FILINGS 
PER JUDGE 
1890 841 --­ II 77 
1900 1093 30% 25 44 
1910 1672 53% 30 56 
1920 1523 9% 34 45 
1930 2874 89% 45 64 
1940 3446 20% 55 63 
1950 2678 -22% 64 42 
1960 3765 41% 66 57 
1970 11440 204% 90 127 
1980 23155 102% 120 193 
1990 34995 51% 168 208 
Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts 
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Table 3 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS CASELOAD BY CIRCUIT, 1980-89 
CIRCUIT / YEAR 
'80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 
1 688 761 903 825 966 950 1090 1035 1151 1175 
2 1829 2608 2388 2352 2541 2455 2600 2705 2668 2908 
3 1659 1600 1850 2164 2137 2236 2191 2274 2652 2776 
4 1981 1943 2390 2140 2058 2489 2493 2632 2766 2913 
5 3682 4229 2317 2777 3120 3094 3349 3828 3859 4362 
6 1823 2016 2265 2438 2599 2737 3237 3425 3467 3754 
7 1544 1717 1820 2072 1986 1940 2007 1923 2163 2416 
8 975 1156 1405 1492 1609 1815 1842 2035 2150 2477 
9 2928 3288 3443 3568 4043 4258 4351 4790 5571 5450 
10 1228 1351 1537 1557 1638 1695 1715 1705 1768 1884 
11 ---­ ---­ 2326 2818 3205 3620 3617 3578 3648 4006 
DC 922 722 907 836 704 1271 933 868 823 874 
Source: Computed from data submitted by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts 
* No data was available for the annual case filings of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
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Analysis of Case Filings* 
It becomes apparent that the period between 1958 and 1962 
represents a turning point for the caseload of the Supreme Court 
and the Courts of Appeals (Figure 3). In the past ten years the 
total civil case filings for the Courts of Appeals clearly 
outnumber the total criminal case filings (See Figure 4). Of 
those civil matters, private cases including mostly federal 
questions and diversity of citizenship matters constitute approx­
imately 70 percent of the civil caseload. The other 30 percent 
consists of public law matters where the government is a party to 
the cause of action. Such percentages for the Courts of Appeals 
have remained constant throughout the ten-year span from 1980. 
Additionally, areas that seem to indicate a substantial 
burden for the Courts of Appeals include civil rights, diversity 
of citizenship, tax suits and social security laws. The Ninth 
Circuit, over the past ten years, has carried the highest case-
load with the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits also having a 
substantial amount of judicial business. Conversely, the lowest 
number of case filings exist at the District of Columbia Circuit 
and the First Circuit. 
*	 Analysis of the data submitted by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts 
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With respect to the Supreme Court, over a ten-year span 
beginning in 1980 approximately 50 percent of the filed petitions 
on writ of certiorari have concerned private civil matters while 
40 percent have been of a criminal nature. However, only approx­
imately 9 percent of the petitions involving criminal cases are 
actually granted. The highest percentage of cases granted in a 
particular area are private civil cases which involve constitu­
tional questions and a number of taxation matters. Around 4 
percent of administrative appeals are filed with the Supreme 
Court. However, of those cases 8 percent are actually granted 
and decided on the merits. David O'Brien, Professor of Political 
Science at the University of Virginia, recently found the follow­
ing subject areas represented in the written opinions issued by 
the Court: Constitutional (56%), Taxation (18.9%), Statutory, 
(15.1%), Administrative (9%), and Criminal (4%).34 
Measuring the Workload Increase 
Judicial caseload is not always comparable to judicial 
workload. As Richard Posner maintains, "A case is not a standard 
measurement like a quart or a constant inflation-free dollar.,,35 
If an increase in case filings were associated with a decrease in 
the difficulty of the average case, the figures on caseload 
growth would exaggerate the actual increase in the workload of 
the courts. Likewise, a stabilization or a decrease in caseload 
coupled with an increase in the complexity of the average case 
•
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would disguise the severity of the caseload/workload crisis. 
Hence, figures on case filings cannot be solely relied upon to 
validate the caseload/workload crisis. 
However, much evidence exists indicating that the 
statistics accurately reflect the increased workload of the 
appellate courts. Such evidence can be found by considering the 
mounting backlog that exists in the appellate courts, the number 
of appellate terminations after hearing or submission, the 
increased reliance of a judge on his support and legal staffs, 
the growing complexity of a case's subject matter and the mount­
ing concern for this crisis expressed by the appellate judges and 
justices. Such findings, when taken together, offer compelling 
reasons to assert that the caseload figures accurately illustrate 
a case overload in the appellate courts and an unendurable work­
load for the appellate justices. 
The Courts of Appeals. There are presently 25,930 cases that 
are pending on appeal in the Courts of Appeals circuits. 36 
Those cases that are "pending" have not been acted upon during 
the year for which they were granted, and consequently an accumu­
lation of cases over the years exist. The Ninth Circuit consist­
ing of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands 
has the largest backlog with the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits 
close behind. 37 This backlog coupled with the 34,995 cases 
filings for this past term suggest an enormous burden on the 
•
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appellate courts when attempting to fulfill their unique respon­
sibilities. 
Another way to measure workload as distinct from raw case­
load is to examine the number of terminations on the merits, that 
is, the number of terminations after court consideration and 
judgment on a particular case. Case terminations before these 
stages in the appellate process require less time. Thus, an 
increase in the number of cases that are heard in an official 
manner or are submitted for consideration to a panel of judges 
reflects an increase in the amount of work a judge must perform. 
In 1960 the total number of terminations after hearing or submis­
sion came to 2,681 cases out of an overall 3,713 terminations 38 
whereas in 1989 the terminations on the merits totaled 19,322 
39cases . In terms of percentage, the number of terminations 
after oral arguments or submission has increased by 621 percent 
since 1960. 
Additionally, the considerable increase in the length of the 
opinions issued by the Courts of Appeals and in the length of 
footnotes and citations included within those opinions suggest 
that a considerable amount of time is invested in opinion writ­
ing--an exclusive appellate function. Again, over a span of 
twenty-five years beginning in 1960, the length of the Courts of 
Appeals' opinions nearly doubled. 40 Moreover, considerable evi­
dence exists to relate this increase in the length of opinions 
and in the number of footnotes and citations to a greater com­
plexity in a case's subject matter. 41 Indeed, Judge Patricia 
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Wald, currently serving on the District of Columbia Circuit, 
remarks, "Another important change in at least the D.C. Circuit's 
caseload is the increasingly technical, complex nature of subject 
matter.,,42 Such cases not only have subject matters that are 
complicated and specialized but also involve records with thou­
sands of pages, multiple issues, and numerous parties all of 
which require judicial attention and contribute significantly to 
the judge's burdensome workload. 
Finally, specific Courts of Appeals judges have expressed 
concern over the growing burden placed upon them by the caseload 
increase. Richard Posner contends that the appellate system is 
"on the verge of being radically changed for the worse under the 
pressure of the rapid and unremi t ting growth in casel oad. ,,43 
Posner goes on to predict a deterioration in the federal court 
system if reforms are not immediately implemented. Additionally, 
D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald, emphasizes that a federal 
appellate court has no control over the total number of docketed 
cases as is the case for the Supreme Court, for every rejected 
litigant in the district court has the right to appeal a final 
order once. She indicates that this, in effect, places a heavier 
burden upon the intermediate appellate courts and predicts that 
"heavier caseloads and increasingly complex subject matter are 
surely here to stay.,,44 Wald concludes that in order for the 
appellate level to survive this deluge of cases a concentrated 
effort must be made toward acknowledging the essence of the 
judicial role, preserving it, and making adjustments in light of 
I 
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it. Essentially, all of these viewpoints stem from the over­
whelming concern generated by statistical findings and judicial 
observations that the conditions necessary for the successful 
functioning of the appellate level do not exist and will not in 
the future unless immediate and effective measures are taken. 
The Supreme Court. Capturing the essence of the caseload problem 
Justice John Paul Stevens remarks, "We are too busy to decide 
whether there is anything we can do about the problem of being 
too busy. ,,45 Indeed, all of the justices agree that there ex­
ists a serious problem in need of resolution. Such a problem not 
only includes the work demands placed upon the justices but also 
the lack of time to formulate and to implement a plan of action 
amidst a docket full of complex, diversified cases. The fact 
that all of the justices agree that the increase in caseload for 
their Court accurately reflects an increase in their workload is 
persuasive in substantiating the workload dilemma. However, 
other indications of a heightened workload exist and are worth 
examining. 
First, since the litigation boom in the 1960s, there has 
been a substantial decrease in the number of granted petitions 
for review on writ of certiorari. Prior to this caseload growth, 
the Supreme Court maintained a 17.5 percentage rate for the 
number of petitions for review on writ of certiorari that it 
granted. Conversely, by the late 1980s, only 5.7 percent of the 
petitions from the federal courts were granted. On a larger 
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scale, over the last ten years the Court has received from the 
federal courts 27,370 petitions for review on writ of certiorari 
of which 90 percent were denied and 4 percent were dismissed. 
Hence, only 6 percent of the petitions that have come to the 
Supreme Court for review on writ of certiorari over the past ten 
years have been granted. The following table displays this 
decrease in the percentage of petitions: 
Table 3 
PERCENTAGE OF PETITIONS FOR REVIEW ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
 
THAT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT
 
YEAR NUMBER OF 
PETITIONS 
1940 951 
1950 1017 
1960 1899 
1970 3286 
1980 2433 
1990 3166 
I 
Source:	 Computed from data submitted by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts 
Justice John Paul Stevens further remarked that the Court is 
now processing more litigation and granting more petitions for 
review on writ of certiorari than ever before (Table 3).46 An 
increase in case filings and an increase in the number of peti­
tions for review that the Court has granted, coupled with a de-
NUMBER OF
 
PETITIONS
 
GRANTED
 
166 
113 
141 
317 
139 
182 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 
PETITIONS 
17.5% 
11.1% 
7.4% 
9.6% 
5.7% 
5.7% 
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crease in the percentage of petitions that have been granted, 
strongly suggests that the justices simply cannot keep pace with 
the workload the case filings are creating. Further, Justice 
stevens admits that he does not have the time to look at the 
petitions in over 80 percent of the cases that are filed. 47 
Consequently, it is the responsibility of stevens' law clerks to 
review these cases and select a small minority of petitions that 
the clerks believe Justice Stevens would have selected himself. 
stevens concludes that the other members of the Court with the 
exception of Justice Brennan also follow this practice. 48 
In support of this contention, David O'Brien, author of 
storm Center, also acknowledges the Supreme Court's tendency to 
rely heavily on its law clerks' recommendations when voting on 
petitions in conference. 49 O'Brien additionally offers statis­
tics demonstrating that only in rare occasions do the justices 
deviate from the recommendations of their clerks. 50 Posner also 
explores this reliance of the justices upon their law clerks. In 
a special section titled "The Rise of the Law Clerk", Posner 
devotes a significant amount of time examining the role of the 
law clerk. Posner emphasizes that the law clerks not only 
inherit a degree of influence in assuming the justices' screening 
responsiblities but also play an active role in the writing of 
opinions. Of significant interest, Posner points out that every 
few years the style and the tone of the justices' opinions 
change. He contends that it is no coincidence that this periodic 
change corresponds with the average length of a law clerk's 
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term. 51 On the whole, much evidence exists to indicate that the 
justices are overburdened and, out of necessity, must delegate 
specific responsibilities to court personnel. 
The amount of time invested in writing an opinion which 
reverses a lower court's decision naturally requires more judi­
cial time and reflection since the judge must provide solid 
reasons for reversal. Accordingly, O'Brien reports an increasing 
reversal rate in the number of Supreme Court decisions overruled 
by the Court and in the number of congressional acts over­
turned. 52 This reversal rate is intensified by the current 
shifting in judicial philosophy among the Court as the Reagan 
appointments begin to gain influence on the Court. Whereas the 
Court has an increased tendency toward reversal, it also is 
becoming more divided in its philosophies and in response to very 
complex, controversial cases that merit judicial attention. 
Consequently, separate opinions (whether concurring or dissent­
ing) are more often the norm than the exception. 
All of these developments in the Supreme Court indicate the 
growing difficulty for the justices to adequately function when 
up against the challenge of managing its inflating docket. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the "1989 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary," emphasizes that the increasing volume of 
cases is only part of the problem facing the courts today. "The 
nature of the caseload is also becoming more burdensome ... Complex 
cases that require extensive judicial time now represent a 
greater portion of the overall caseload. ,,53 Justice Harry 
I 
31 
Blackmun also expresses concern over the caseload growth and the 
threat it poses to the appellate process. For him, experience 
dictates that the heavier the caseload, the less possibility of 
proper performance and adjudication. He concludes, "The Nation, 
in my opinion, deserves bet ter than this. ,,54 
Examining the Consequences 
Recently, Justice stevens remarked that the unwieldy flow of 
litigation "is having a more serious impact on the administration 
of justice than is generally recognized.,,55 Additionally, 
Former Chief Justice Burger asserts, "The work of the Supreme 
Court of the United states will breakdown or deteriorate in 
quality so that its historic role will not be performed adequate­
1y. ,,56 Such predicti ons of fered by these Supreme Court jus t ices 
suggest the severity of the consequences arising from the appel­
late caseload dilemma. 
Bureaucratization of the federal appellate system is a 
concern of many judicial researchers and members of the legal 
profession while others remain unaffected by the thought of it. 
Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald concedes that the federal 
court system hardly operates as a bureaucratic hierarchy. "Ver­
tically, district to circuit, circuit to Supreme Court, the 
federal judiciary does not function in the hierarchical fashion 
of a typical bureaucracy. ,,57 However, Richard Posner, defining 
a bureaucracy as "a large, organization tenuously held together 
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by paper," views most of the federal courts in a bureaucratic 
58sense. Although the federal courts structurally may not re­
semble a bureaucratic institution, certain specific character­
istics of a bureaucracy exist. 
First, there has been an enormous expansion in the number 
of federal appellate judges and their support staff. As indicat­
ed in Table 2, only eleven judges presided on the Courts of 
Appeals in 1890 whereas 126 judges exist today. A proliferation 
of supporting personnel within court chambers and an emphasis on 
managerial practices and modern office technology also hint at a 
bureaucratic emergence. Much of this was initiated by Chief 
Justice Burger who introduced office technology and a more 
complex internal structure within the court chambers to promote 
efficiency, 
Joseph Vining, Professor of Law at University of Michigan, 
remarks that the structure of the courts is becoming much too 
complicated as he has witnessed the emergence of "layers" in the 
staffs of the law clerks and administrative assistants. 59 David 
O'Brien observes that the justices have acquired more clerks, 
more on-staff attorneys, and more secretarial personnel. Fur­
ther, the court's administrative assistant staff has become more 
professional and involved in the court's workload. GO Likewise, 
the Federal Judicial Center, the United states Judicial Confer­
ence (referred to as the "right arm of the jUdiciary") and the 
Administrative Office of the United states Courts can also be 
viewed as important extensions of the Federal Judiciary which add 
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to the numbers populating this branch of the Federal Government. 
More frequent communication among the judges through written 
memoranda as opposed to personal one-to-one conferences repre­
sents another bureaucratic dimension. Court of Appeals Judge 
Alvin Rubin argues that such a lack of verbal communication 
decreases the collegiality among justices--an important element 
in the appellate function. 61 In effect, the judges or justices 
are becoming more isolated and unaccountable as well as less 
sociable. This can serve as a detriment to the appellate func­
tion in which an essential part rests on collegial discussion of 
and reflection on certain areas of law. 
Another major consequence of the caseload/workload increase 
is a growing non-uniformity in the Courts of Appeals' decisions. 
To cope with the volume of cases, the Courts of Appeals must 
combine to form hundreds of revolving, unpredictable three-judge 
decisional units. This consequently leads to non-uniformity. 
Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at University of Virginia, claims 
that regional organization where non-uniformity in decisions can 
germinate is a source of increasing problems. He continues to 
acknowledge that "the potential for decisional disharmony today 
is even greater than the existence of sixty-five different courts 
would suggest.,,62 In principle, the application of law must be 
uniform. Hence, non-uniformity can not only create confusion in 
the legal arena but also instill a degree of distrust in a 
specific law or, more broadly, in the people's overall under­
standing of the law and its purpose. Prior measures to reduce 
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the chance of non-uniformity among the Courts of Appeals were to 
hold mandatory judicial conferences where confusion in the 
application of a specific law would be resolved through discus­
sion among the justices. 
However, with an increase in judicial workload and a growing 
complexity in case subject-matter, judges and justices have found 
it extremely difficult to hold and to attend enough conferences 
to make substantial progress with this problem. 
Another repercussion of the caseload/workload dilemma is the 
change in the judge's role and his responsiblities. Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist in an address delivered to the American 
Bar Association recalled that in the 1950s a federal appeals 
judgeship was commonly thought of as a "dignified form of semi­
retirement".63 A federal appeals judgeship today is an extrem.e 
deviation from that described by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Indeed, as the judge has had to delegate his traditional 
responsiblities and assume more court/case management functions, 
he, in effect, has been transformed from a jurist to an adminis­
trator and from a draftsman to an editor (with respect to his 
opinion-writing responsibility). Such a role change has presented 
judgeships as less attractive positions for which to strive. 64 
Essentially, this could jeopardize the quality of the judicial 
product arising out of the federal appeals courts. 
The diminished quality of federal appellate services is one 
of the most serious consequences. Several factors contribute to 
this condition. First, today there exists only limited opportu­
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nity for complete appellate review. Whereas the Courts of 
Appeals must hear all cases that come before it, the Supreme 
Court, having discretionary review, grants annually only 5 
percent of the petitions which come to it. Essentially, the 
title of "court of last resort", traditionally associated with 
the Supreme Court, can be transferred to the Courts of Appeals 
since they are basically the last step in the litigation process 
for the litigants. 
The reduction of time allotted for oral argument also 
diminishes the quality of judicial services because argument is 
such an integral part of the appellate function. In 1848, the 
Court began reducing the time involved in oral argument. Before 
1848, unlimited time for oral arguments existed. The 1848 rule 
limited oral arguments to eight hours per case; subsequently, in 
1871 the time length was reduced again to four hours per case. 
By 1911 the two parties in the case were limited to an hour and a 
half, and in 1970 the justices were persuaded by Chief Justice 
Burger to further shorten oral arguments to thirty minutes per 
side. 55 Proponents of oral arguments, one of which is Court of 
Appeals Judge Patricia Wald, contend that much value resides in 
the concept of oral argument. "Oral argument places the 
decision-maker face-to-face with the contestants and gives what 
is often a remote and abstract legal system an important human 
character. ,,66 Addi tionall y, she asserts that a judge wi 11 ap­
proach a case in a different manner when oral arguments are 
involved because of the opportunity to question and to conduct 
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discussion with the counsel litigating the case. Even in the 
Courts of Appeals, oral arguments are now limited to only 50 
percent of the cases. 67 Thus, in the words of Judge Wa 1d, "Oral 
argument is a vi tal but endangered species. ,,68 
Not only are there increasingly limited opportunities for 
complete appellate review but also skepticism as to the authority 
of opinions drafted by law clerks rather than the judges and 
justices themselves. Joseph Vining stresses that the legal 
profession's ultimate source of primary authority resides in the 
opinions of the Supreme Court. Indeed, these opinions are "the 
text of choice for American 1egal anal ysis. ,,69 He deems these 
opinions as unauthored and patched together by support personnel 
in the center of a bureaucratic environment. Thus, a waning 
respect for and trust in the Supreme Court's authority as ex­
pressed through the Supreme Court's most valuable instrument--the 
opinion--can prove to be dangerous and potentially irreversible 
in the future if changes are not made. 
Justice Stevens predicts that the problem of court delay 
will be a serious consequence of the caseload/workload in­
70crease. Thus, not only will the appellate courts have to 
contend with increasing caseloads but also the accumulation of 
pending cases. As a result, it will be inevitable that those 
cases having the most importance will receive the attention of 
the justices whereas matters of secondary importance will be put 
aside or delegated to the members of the judge's support staff. 
The most profound consequence of the appellate dilemma is 
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the changing public perception of the federal court system and, 
more broadly, the concept of justice. Certainly, the appellate 
level's inability to function properly and effectively lessens 
the value of its services. Consequently, Jethro K. Lieberman, 
author of The Litigious Society concludes that Americans may be 
litigating more, but they are increasingly becoming less satis­
fied. 71 Additionally, Joseph Vining asserts with concern that 
there exists "a sense among serious analysts that the Supreme 
Court is failing them. ,,72 He continues by stating that these 
rather harsh complaints are also accompanied by a more general 
tone. of commentary which indicates a growing disrespect for and 
lack of faith in the internal workings of the present federal 
judicial system. In an article entitled "Generic Justice", 
Howard A. Specter, former President of the American Bar Associ­
ation, asserts that an increasingly high number of people are 
viewing the concept of justice and the value of court 
services as a product "to be labeled, marked down, weighed and 
bagged at the 1oca 1 supermarket". 73 Hence, he cha 11 enges soci­
ety and members of the legal profession to rediscover the humane 
aspect of the law which in itself allows the legal system to be 
treated more delicately than a bureaucratic institution. The 
disintegration of law and its authority is a real and immediate 
concern for the nineties. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REFORMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter deals specifically with the reforms and the 
recommendations that have been advanced in an effort to resolve 
the caseload dilemma. While some reforms have occurred, those 
changes have had only a short term effect on the caseload. 
Indeed, within a few years of the reforms, the case filings esca­
lated to a higher number than before the change took place. 74 
There exists a need for the type of reform which will be long­
range and highly effective when applied. 
Reforms 
Technological innovation has been one of the reforms imple­
mented over the past fifteen to twenty years. Such changes have 
accelerated the processing of the caseload within the judge's 
court chamber but have had no effect on the actual workload of 
the judge. Indeed, David O'Brien remarks that although such 
technological improvements can have an effect on the internal 
structure, there remains the burdensome judicial workload. 75 
Another reform that has been relied upon is the creation of 
additional judgeships. However, several arguments have been 
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advanced in opposition to such a reform. The Federal Courts 
study Committee, recently created by Congress to examine problems 
facing the courts of the United states, stresses that several 
problems can arise from the creation of additional judgeships. 
First, a larger judiciary can provoke more conflicting opinions 
and uncertainty in the application of law within the circuit or 
among the circuits. Second, as the court becomes larger, so does 
the possibility of a diminishing familiarity and collegiality 
among the circuit judges. Third, an increased size of the 
judicial branch strains the judicial appointment process which in 
effect could allow unqualified candidates to attain judgeships. 
Finally, as the judicial institution grows and the judge has less 
time for individual contribution, the attractiveness of an 
appellate judgeship decreases. 76 Further, J. Woodford Howard, 
Jr. states that adding to the number of judges precipitates a 
bureaucratic structure. He remarks that increasing the number of 
judges offers a quick fix for small circuits; however, adding 
judicial manpower to larger circuits "raises a galaxy of qualita­
tive issues concerning the optimum size, number and internal 
operating procedures".77 This is not to say that the mere 
creation of additional judgeships is not advantageous. However, 
it cannot be the sole reform to be implemented. Additional 
reforms are needed. 
Also, numerous changes in jurisdiction, structure and court 
procedure have evolved in response to the increased caseload. 
Most recently, the appellate courts are now imposing penalties 
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for frivolous case filings. 78 Again, these changes have pro­
duced only short term effects and have had only a slight impact 
on the overall number of case filings. 
Recommendations 
Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at the University of Virgin­
ia, has recommended a restructuring of the United states· Courts 
of Appeals by modifying its regional design. He emphasizes that 
"regional organization is the source of increasing problems in 
the administration of federal law. ,,79 The most serious probl em 
is the non-uniformity among the Courts of Appeals circuits. He 
concludes that the potential for "decisional disharmony" is even 
greater than imagined. To resolve this problem Meador advocates 
the elimination of the regional design of the Courts of Appeals 
and the implementation of non-regional subject matter courts at 
the intermediate appellate level. Essentially, this would 
abolish any non-uniformity since the same types of cases would be 
heard in one specialized tribunal. 
Court of Appeals Judge Patricia Wald strongly opposes such 
an idea. She remarks, "Specialty courts invite domination by the 
specia 1i zed bar - - -no one el se unders tands or cares. ,,80 She 
further contends that specialized courts tend to take the judges 
out of the mainstream of the law and of the legal developments. 
Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner advocates a different 
approach rather than specialization. Posner primarily argues for 
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judicial self-restraint to compensate for the large number of 
federal rights granted to individuals during the 1960s. In 
addition, he urges more institutional rather than individualistic 
opinions as well as more legal education with respect to judicial 
administration. 
Again, Judge Patricia Wald indicates her opposition to such 
a proposal. "The heavier caseload in large part reflects better 
access to the courts and more legal protections and benefits for 
less-favored members of society. I resist any wholesale surren­
der of these hard-fought victories to 'reformers' rallying under 
the banner of judicial efficiency."Sl Indeed, Posner seems to 
advocate efficiency at the expense of individual rights. 
Another major recommendation for court reform is the cre­
ation of a National Court of Appeals. Throughout the years 
variations in this concept have occurred. Thus, three distinct 
proposals for a National Court of Appeals now exist. First, as 
endorsed by the Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, a National 
Court of Appeals should be created which would be located between 
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. This tribunal would 
hear those cases referred to it by the Supreme Court. Therefore, 
if the Supreme Court thought a case was worthy of court evalua­
tion but did not have time to review it, the case would be given 
to the National Court of Appeals. The Freund Committee of 1972 
suggested another variation in this "National Court of Appeals" 
concept. According to the Freund Committee report, a court 
sitting between the levels of the Courts of Appeals and the 
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Supreme Court would screen all petitions that came to the Supreme 
Court and make recommendations on which petitions should be 
granted review. 82 Finally, Justice Stevens proposed a third 
variation quite similar to that recommended by the Freund Commit­
tee. He advocates the creation of a National Court of Appeals 
which not only would be responsible for making recommendations 
but also would have the power to decide which cases the Supreme 
Court woul d revi ew. 83 
However, implications arise from these three variations. 
First, the "screening" function is an integral part of the 
Supreme Court's power; for, to delegate the screening function 
would be to give up a part of the Supreme Court's authority. The 
Constitution mandates that judicial power be vested in one 
supreme court. Thus, the constitutionality of this proposed court 
is questionable since the court would be assuming one of the 
Supreme Court's major functions, the power to determine the 
Court's judicial business. Second, the aim of the Freund propos­
al is to relieve the justices of their "screening" responsi­
bilities and allow them more time to concentrate on research and 
opinion writing. However, by implementing the Freund committee's 
proposal, the justices would still have to perform screening 
responsiblities since the proposed court would only have the 
power to recommend which petitions for review should be granted. 
Finally, if Justice Stevens' recommendation were to be put in 
effect, the Supreme Court would never see the petitions for 
review or the respective areas of law that the petitions would 
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address. Such a proposal would limit the Supreme Court's power 
and cloud its insight into developing areas of law. 
Finally, the Federal Courts Study Committee has proposed 
several reform alternatives to be considered by the judiciary and 
others interested in court reform. First, it suggests the 
elimination of the present Courts of Appeals circuits and the 
creation of multiple small circuits consisting of only nine or 
ten judges. 84 While the small size might foster an appropriate 
environment for judicial deliberation and contemplation, the 
restructuring could cause more disharmony in circuit decisions. 
Additionally, as the number of case filings continue to increase, 
this recommendation could have only a short term effect since no 
mechanism for dealing with rising case filings in these small 
circuits has been proposed. 
The Federal Courts study Committee's second alternative for 
court reform is the creation of a four-tier system. 8S The addi­
tional layer would reside in between the Courts of Appeals and 
the Supreme Court. This new layer of four to five new tribunals 
would have discretionary review over appeals from the lower 
circuits. This alternative could be beneficial if it could 
eliminate some of the confusion as to the uniform application of 
law in the Courts of Appeals. However, it is apparent that this 
recommendation would merely add another layer to the present 
court structure and could potentially contribute to the bureau­
cratization of the federal court system. 
Finally, the creation of national subject matter courts, as 
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supported by Daniel Meador, has been outlined as another alterna­
tive by the Federal Courts study Committee. The committee agrees 
that a wide creation of these specialized courts would create 
numerous political and organizational issues. Therefore, only 
limited creation of specialized courts are warranted according to 
the committee. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROPOSAL 
Introduction 
Any proposal for appellate court reform needs to recognize 
not only the essential functions of the appellate judge that must 
be preserved but also the nature of the case filings that most 
severely jeopardize those functions. A growing trend in techni­
cal, complex cases which demand more judicial time, concentration 
and resources has occurred throughout the 1980s. Additionally, 
the number of civil cases, in particular those involving private 
civil matters, constitute a large portion of the appellate court 
docket. While drug-related criminal case filings are predicted 
to clutter the appellate court dockets and take priority over 
other cases in the 1990s, the constant and substantial amount of 
taxation and social security matters also reflect burdensome 
areas for the judges in the upcoming decade. 
It is clear that no single, all-encompassing reform will 
totally annihilate the appellate court dilemma. However, a 
series of gradual and focused reforms looks promising with 
respect to improving the caseload crisis in the federal appellate 
courts. While the caseload burden poses a threat to both levels 
of the federal appellate court system, data indicates that it 
most significantly impinges on the United States Courts of 
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Appeals. With the growing non-uniformity among the Courts of 
Appeals circuits, the primary aim of a long-range proposal should 
be to ensure public trust and satisfaction in judicial services 
through, among other things, the uniform application of law. 
Accordingly, I propose the following recommendations: 
1.	 The creation and/or reallocation of judgeships. 
2.	 The creation of a u.s. Court of Appeals for Admin­
istrative Agencies, a U.S. Court for Tax Appeals 
and a U.S. Court for Social Security 
Appeals. 
3.	 The creation of a U.S. Court of Review for 
Intercircuit Conflicts. 
4.	 The creation of an Office of Judicial Impact 
Assessment. 
For immediate relief, judgeships should be added to the 
Courts of Appeals respective to the needs of each circuit. 
The present "case participation per appellate judge" formula used 
by the Judicial Conference as a standard for determining an 
appropriate number of judgeships to accommodate workload should 
be applied at this point. However, in the next few years, a new 
formula sensitive to the difficulty of and time element involved 
in particular types of cases needs to be constructed. The 
Federal Judicial Center, the research branch of the Federal 
Judiciary, would be responsible for the creation and implementa­
tion of such a formula. A creation of additional judgeships and 
a reallocation of existing ones where necessary will occur after 
this formula is developed. 
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Many members of the legal profession as well as researchers 
of judicial administration question the effectiveness of merely 
adding judgeships to counteract the growing caseload/workload. 
Indeed, past experience dictates that the creation of additional 
judgeships for the Courts of Appeals circuits has only short term 
effects. However, until a more accurate formula can be con­
structed, establishing new judgeships can provide immediate 
relief to those circuits that are straining their institutional 
capacity. 
A recent case study of the Ninth Circuit reveals that al­
though the circuit is the largest in the Courts of Appeals with 
respect to the number of appellate judgeships and case filings, 
notable improvements in the court's performance and uniformity in 
decision has occurred. 86 As the Ninth Circuit insists on its 
effectiveness87 , Professor Arthur Hellman who has conducted 
research on the question of problems arising from large circuits 
looks positively on the current performance of the Ninth Circuit 
and regards it as "the harbinger of future appellate courts 
rather than as an abnormality. ,,88 It is necessary to note that 
the Ninth Circuit has been allowed to experiment with very 
specialized reforms which it believes will be effective for the 
particular needs of its circuit. Thus, attached to the proposal 
for additional appellate judgeships is the freedom for all of the 
Courts of Appeals circuits to implement specialized reforms. 
In effect, this provides a mechanism for minimizing the potential 
risks involved in increasing the number of judgeships. 
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There also exists a need for a limited number of specialized 
courts. The three United states Courts of Appeals for Tax, 
Social Security, and Administrative Agency matters would preside 
at the same level as the other circuit courts, and direct review 
of these courts' decisions would exist. The creation of these 
courts would take many of the complicated, time-consuming cases 
away from the regional courts and would place them in specialized 
tribunals able to deal effectively and efficiently with such 
cases. of extreme importance, it follows that a greater degree 
of uniformity in these areas would exist. 
Opponents of this "specialized court" concept present 
reasonable and realistic arguments against such a reform. 
Indeed, specialization could foster a narrow-minded attitude when 
application of law is necessary. However, the threat of such a 
concept to the American judicial system is minimized by the 
limited number of specialized tribunals that would be 
created. 
Additionally, Daniel Meador points out certain areas of law 
are ideal for the implementation of this concept. The types of 
cases that are suitable for this type of reform are those cases 
that constitute a significant amount of the judge's workload but 
are not enough in number to allow that judge to deal coherently 
and constructively with that field of law. 89 After much re­
search, the creation of these specialized courts seems to be 
extremely beneficial to the present appellate court system since 
over the last ten years a constant and substantial percentage of 
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the appellate caseload involves social security, tax, and admin­
istrative agency matters. 
The proposal's most significant reform is the creation of a 
United states Court of Review for Intercircuit Conflicts. Such 
a court would consist of two divisions with nine permanent judges 
sitting en banc in each division. This court would exist between 
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Mandatory 
review for all intercircuit conflicts would exist in addition to 
the opportunity to file a petition for writ of certiorari before 
the Supreme Court. One of the divisions would consider cases 
specifically involving private civil matters; the other division 
would be responsible for conflicts of a criminal or public 
nature. The court would also be in charge of planning and con­
ducting judicial conferences for the Courts of Appeals level 
(modeled after the Judicial Conference of the United States) 
which would be geared toward discussing and improving court 
administration and judicial adjudication among the circuits. 
The advantage of such a proposal is that uniformity and 
public trust in the law would be maintained. Joseph Vining 
indicates that much of the growing dissatisfaction in the judi­
cial system stems from the Courts of Appeals' lack of uniformity 
in applying the law. 90 Not only would greater uniformity exist 
because of the function of this court, but also discussion of 
specific problems in the application of law among the circuits 
would be facilitated at the judicial conferences organized by 
this court. Other advantages of this proposal are that the 
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prestige and the nature of the position would attract well­
qualified judges, and fundamental rights would be secured against 
those who advocate judicial restraint as a reform measure. 
Finally, an Office of Judicial Impact Assessment, as recom­
mended by the Federal Courts study Committee, should be 
established. This office would advise Congress on the impact of 
proposed legislation and would offer assistance in drafting 
legislation which most likely would lead to litigation. Such an 
office would be directed from the Federal Judicial Center. 
Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, co-authoring the 
book Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, emphasize 
that although judicial impact assessment theory is still in its 
infant stage, there exists a growing recognition of its impor­
tance. 91 Increased understanding of the impact of legislation 
would most emphatically eliminate several of the statutory case 
filings at both the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court; for, 
legislative enactments could be worded more wisely and the 
statutory intentions could be expressed more clearly. 
CHAPTER VI
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
The Judicial Branch of the Federal Government is a unique 
institution; for, technically, it has no power. In section 78 of 
The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton points out that as the 
executive branch "holds the sword of the community" and the 
legislative branch "commands the purse," the judiciary has only 
the cogency of its arguments on which to rely. This has not re­
stricted the federal judiciary from becoming a powerful and 
effective institution in society. However, essential to its 
success has been the public trust in and respect for its func­
tions, its purpose and its demonstrated past wisdom. For the 
court to continue to be an influential part of society, it must 
maintain the public's approval. 
The increase in case filings at the federal appellate level 
has created an enormous judicial workload for the appellate 
judges. Serious consequences have arisen from judicial efforts 
to manage this workload. The most profound of these is the 
public's changing perception of the federal court system and of 
the concept of justice. Indeed, dissatisfaction and distrust in 
the appellate courts are becoming more prevalent. 
In the "1989 Year-End Report on the Judiciary," Chief 
Justice Rehnquist emphasizes that the federal judiciary is in 
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trouble. He believes that if court reforms are not made within 
the very near future, the caseload growth will overcome the 
judges and justices and trigger a slow destruction of the system. 
The proposal advanced in this paper advocates short term as well 
as long term reforms which will gradually modify the system and 
restore public confidence in it by ensuring uniformity and 
quality in judicial services. 
Indeed, judicial reform has become a national priority and 
action must be taken. Daniel Meador, Professor of Law at Univer­
sity of Virginia, concludes that Americans have come to a point 
where "judicial architects" must return to the drawing board and 
modify the present court structure to fit the altered circum­
stances of time. Just as a major reform was necessary in 1891, 
it is also necessary as the United states federal court system 
approaches 1991. The challenge to the judiciary of the 1990s 
will be the managing of appeals in the federal courts. 
•
 
ENDNOTES 
1. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (st. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1979) 700. 
2. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (st. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1979) 766. 
3. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (st. Paul: 
West Publishing Company, 1979) 1443. 
4. United states Constitution, Article III, Section I. 
5. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, The 
United states Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989) 6. 
6. Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The 
United states Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989) 6. 
7. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, The 
United States Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989) 8. 
8. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
9. T.E. Baker, A Primer on the Jurisdiction of the 
United states Courts of Appeals, (Washington, D.C.: 
Federal Judicial Center, 1989) 4. 
10. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat 333. 
11. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631; Act of 
March 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794 as amended by Act of Febru­
ary 19, 1864, ch. 11, 13 Stat. 4. 
12. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
13. Act of March 11, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 
1087. 
14. Act of February 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 
936. 
15. Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45 Stat. 
1346. 
53 
•
 
54 
16. Act of June 25 1 1948 1 Pub. L. No. 80-773 1 62 stat. 869. 
17. Act of October 14 1 1980 1 Pub. L. No. 96-452 1 94 stat. 
1994. 
18. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 1 28 usc Sec. 41 
(1982). 
19. Lawrence Baum l American Courts: Process and PolicYI 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986) 36.l 
20. United states Constitution Article 111 1 Section II.l 
21. United states Constitution Article 111 1 Section II.l 
22. Act of September 25 1 1988 1 Pub. L. No. 100-352 1 102 
Stat. 662. 
23. Administrative Office of the United States Courts l The 
United States Courts l Their Jurisdiction and Work l 
(Washington l D.C.: Congressional QuarterlYI 1989) 11. 
24. Administrative Office of the United States Courts l The 
United States Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work l 
(Washington I D.C.: Congressional QuarterlYI 1989) 11. 
25. Erwin C. SurrencYI History of the Federal Courts l (New 
York: Oceana Publications l 1987) 90. 
26. Federal Judicial Center l Report of the Study Group on 
the Caseload of the Supreme Court l (Washington l D.C.: Federal 
Judicial Center 1972) 1.l 
27. Federal Judicial Center l Report of the Study Group on 
the Caseload of the Supreme Court l (Washington l D.C.: Federal 
Judicial Center l 1972) 1. 
28. Richard Posner l The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform l 
(Cambridge l Harvard University Press: 1985) 80. 
29. Mark W. Cannon l "Judicial Administration to the 21st 
CenturY/" Public Administration Review November 1985: 681. 
30. Richard Posner l Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform l 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press l 1985) 93. 
31. Lawrence Baum l The Supreme Court l (Washington l D.C.: 
Congressional QuarterlYI 1989) 105. 
•
 
55 
32. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, The 
United states Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work, (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1989) 6. 
33. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, 
Annual Report of the Director, (Washington D.C.: Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, 1989) Table B-7. 
34. David O'Brien, Storm Center, (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1986) 133. 
35. Richard Posner, Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 66. 
36. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, 
Annual Report of the Director, (Washington, D.C.: Administrative 
Office of the United states Courts, 1989) Table B-7B. 
37. Administrative Office of the United states Courts, 
Annual Report of the Director, (Washington, D.C.: Administrative 
Office of the United states Courts, 1989) Table B-7B. 
38 . Richa r d Po s ne r, ..:.T.:.,:hc=e,--=F--,e::.;:d::..:e:.,;r=-a=-=-l--",C"",o,-"u::.::r;....;t::.;:s:<.--.:..-:_..::::C..::.r..:::i:...=s,""i,--"s"---,a~n=d---=..:R:...=e,-,,f:....oo,,-,r=-=m , 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 69. 
39. Administrative Office of the united states Courts, 
Annual Report of the Director, (Washington, D.C.: Administrative 
Office of the U.s. Courts, 1989) Table B-5. 
40. Richard Posner, Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 72. 
41. Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 73. 
42. Patricia Wald, "The Problem With the Courts," Trial 
June 1984: 30. 
43. Richard Posner, Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) vii. 
44. Patricia Wald, "The Problem with the Courts," Trial 
June 1984: 30. 
45. John Paul Stevens,"Some Thoughts on Judicial Restrain­
t," Judicature 66 November 1982: 179. 
46. John Paul Stevens,"Some Thoughts on Judicial Re­
straint," Judicature 66 November 1982: 178. 
47. John Paul stevens , "Some Thoughts on Judicial Restrain­
t," Judicature 66 November 1982: 179. 
•
 
56 
48. John Paul stevens, "Some Thoughts on Judicial Restrain­
t," Judicature 66 November 1982: 179. 
49. David O'Brien, Storm Center, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1986) 133. 
50. David O'Brien, Storm Center, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1986) 133. 
51. Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985) 107. 
52. David O'Brien, Storm Center, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1986) 43. 
53. William H. Rehnquist, Report, "Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary," Washington, D.C. 1989.J 
54. Federal Judicial Center, Structure and Internal Proce­
dures: Recommendations for Change, (Federal Judicial Center, 
1975) 184. 
55. Justice John Paul Stevens, "Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Restraint," Judicature November 1982: 178. 
56. David O'Brien, "Managing the Business of the Supreme 
Court," Public Administration Review November 1985: 667. 
57. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts," Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1983): 1479. 
58 . Richard Pos ne r, .=T-'='h:..;:eo...-::F:....e;::;.d=-=e.=r..=a:..;:l=---C=..=o.=u=r--=t:..:s:....·=-._-=C.=r-=i:..:s~1=-· s=----=a=n::..;:d::-..:R:.:.=e-=f..=o:..:r:...:.m:..:.. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 115. 
59. Joseph Vining, "Bureaucratic Justice," University of 
Michigan Law Review December 1981: 251. 
60. David O'Brien, "Managing the Business of the Supreme 
Court," Public Administration Review November 1985: 667-677. 
61. Al vin B. Rubin, "Bureaucrati za ti on of the Federa I 
Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency," Notre Dame 
Lawyer 55 (1980): 646. 
62. Daniel Meador, "A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: 
Modifying the Regional Design of the United States Courts of 
Appeals," University of Chicago Law Review Spring 1989: 603. 
63. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Speech, American Bar 
Association Mid-Year Meeting, Colorado, 1989: 1. 
•
 
57 
64. Mark W. Cannon, "Judicial Administration to the 21st 
Century," Public Administration Review November 1985: 681. 
65. David O'Brien, "Managing the Business of the Supreme 
Court," Public Administration Review November 1985: 671. 
66. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts, " Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1983) : 1484. 
67. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts, " Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1983) : 1484. 
68. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts, " Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1983): 1484. 
69. Joseph Vining, "Bureaucratic Justice," University of 
Michigan Law Review December 1981: 251. 
70. Justice John Paul Stevens, "Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Restraint," Judicature November 1982: 178. 
71. Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1981) 4. 
72. Joseph Vining, "Bureaucratic Justice," University of 
Michigan Law Review December 1981: 250. 
73. Howard A. Specter, "Generic Justice," American Bar 
Association Journal 68 November (1982): 6. 
74. David O'Brien, Storm Center, (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1986) 149. 
75. David O'Brien, "Managing the Business of the Supreme 
Court," Public Administration Review November 1985: 667. 
76. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, "Tentative 
Recommendations for Public Comment," 22 December 1989: 7. 
77. Howard, J. Woodford, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the 
Federal Judicial System, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981) 270. 
78. Mark W. Cannon, "Judicial Administration in the 21st 
Century," Public Administration Review November 1985: 682. 
79. Daniel Meador, "A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: 
Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals," 
University of Chicago Law Review Spring 1989: 603. 
•
 
58 
80. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts," Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1983): 1481. 
81. Patricia Wald, "Bureaucracy and the Courts," Yale Law 
Journal 92 (1982): 1479. 
82. Federal Judicial Center, Report, "Report of the study 
Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court," December 1972: 18. 
83. John Paul Stevens, "Some Thoughts on Judicial Re­
straint," JUdicature_ November 1982: 182. 
84. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, "Tentative 
Recommendations for Public Comment," 22 December 1989, 111. 
85. The Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, "Tentative 
Recommendations for Public Comment," 22 December 1989: 112. 
86. Joe S. Cecil, Administration of Justice in a Large 
Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit Innovations Project. (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1985) 1. 
87. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, Report, "Fourth Biennial Report to Congress on the 
Implementation of Section 6 of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 
1978," July 1989: 2. 
88. Federal Courts Study Committee, Report, "Tentative 
Recommendations for Public Comment," 22 December 1989: 108. 
89. Daniel Meador, "Judicial Architecture: Modifying the 
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals," University of 
Chicago Law Review Spring 1989: 603. 
90. Joseph Vining, "Justice, Bureaucracy and Legal Method," 
University of Michigan Law Review December 1981: 249. 
91. Charles A. Johnson and Bradley A. Canon, Judicial 
Policies: Implementation and Impact, (Washington, D.C.: Con­
gressional Quarterly Press, 1984) 224. 
Works Cited 
•
 
Act of November 19, 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 stat. 4642. 
Act of October 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 stat. 1994. 
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 stat. 869. 
Act of February 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, 45 stat. 1346. 
Act of February 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 stat. 936. 
Act of March 11, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 stat. 1087. 
Act of March 3 , 1891, Ch. 517, 26 stat. 826. 
Act of March 3, 1863, Ch. 100, 12 stat. 794. 
Act of March 2 , 1855, Ch. 142, 10 stat. 631. 
Act of February 13, 1801, Ch. 4, 2 stat. 89. 
Act of March 2, 1793, Ch. 22, 1 stat. 333. 
Administrative Office of the United states Courts. Report. Annual 
Report of the Director. Washington, D.C.: 1980-1989. 
Administrative Office of the United states Courts. The United 
states Courts, Their Jurisdiction and Work. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1989. 
Baker, T. E. A Primer on the Jurisdiction of the Uni ted states 
Courts of Appeals. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial 
Center, 1989. 
Baum, Lawrence. Ameri can Courts: Process and Pol i cy . Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1986. 
Baum, Lawrence, Sheldon Goldman and Austin Sarat. "The Evolution 
of Litigation in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1895-1975." 
Law and Society Review. 1983: 291-309. 
Baum, Lawrence. The Supreme Court. Washington, D. C. : 
Congressional Quarterly, 1989. 
Beerman, Jack M. "Crisis? What Crisis? A Review of The Federal 
Courts: Crisis and Reform." Northwestern Law Review. 80 
Spring 1986: 1383-1406. 
59 
•
 
60 
Black, Henry C. Black's Law Dictionary. st. Paul: West 
Publishing Company, 1979. 
Brennan, William J., Jr. "Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's 
Workload." Judicature. 66 December-January 1983: 230-235. 
Cannon, Mark W. "Judicial Administration to the 21st Century." 
Public Administration Review. 45 November 1985: 679-684. 
Cannon, Mark W. and David M. O'Brien. Views From the Bench. 
Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1985. 
Cecil, Joe S. Administration of Justice in a Large Appellate Court: 
The Ninth Circuit Innovations Project. Washington, D.C. 
Federal Judicial Center, 1985. 
Congressional Record. 29 January 1990: 493-497. 
Congressional Record. 25 January 1990: 414-421. 
Congressional Record. 9 May 1989: 5026-5028. 
Dubois, Philip L. The Analysis of Judicial Reform. Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1982. 
Federal Courts Study Committee. Report. Tentative Recommendations 
for Public Comment. 22 December 1989. 
Federal Judicial Center. Central Legal Staffs in the United States 
Courts of Appeal s . Washington, D. C. : Federa I Judi ci al 
Center, 1978. 
Federal Judicial Center. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload 
of the Supreme Court. Washington, D. C. : Federal Judi cial 
Center, 1972. 
Federal Judicial Center. Structure and Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change. Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Judicial Center, 1975. 
Hamilton Alexander, John Jay and James Madison. The Federal ist 
Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. 
Hellman, Arthur D. "Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: 
Does the Supreme Court Need Hel p?" Judi cature. 67 (1983): 
28-48. 
Hoffman, Daniel N. "Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court 
Opinions." Justice System Journal. 6 (1981): 396-433. 
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial
 
System. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
 
•
 
61 
Johnson, Charles A. and Bradley C. Canon. Judicial Policies: 
Implementation and Impact. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1984. 
Judicial Council and the United states Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circui t. Fourth Biennial Report to Congress on the 
Implementation of Section 6 of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 
1978 and Other Measures to Improve the Administration of 
Justice in the Ninth Circuit. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989. 
Lateef, Noel V. "Keeping up with Justice Automation and the New 
Activism." Judicature. 67 (1983): 213-223. 
Lieberman, Jethro K. The Litigious Society. New York: Basic 
Books, 1981. 
McLaughlan, William P. Federal Court Caseloads. New York: Basic 
Books, 1984. 
Meador, Daniel, J. "A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: 
Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals." 
University of Chicago Law Review. 66 Spring 1989: 603-642. 
Meador, Daniel, J. "Comments on the Study of Appellate Co.urt 
Administration." Justice System Journal. 12 (1987): 143­
147. 
Neubauer, David W. ""Are We Approaching Judicial Gridlock? A 
Critical Review of the Literature." Justice System Journal. 
12 November 1987: 363-385. 
0' Bri en, David M. "Managing the Business of the Supreme Court." 
Public Administration Review. 45 November 1985: 667-677. 
O'Brien, David. Storm Center. New York: W.W. Norton, 1986. 
Posner, Richard. The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. 
Powell, Lewis F., Jr., " Are the Federal Courts Becoming 
Bureaucracies?" American Bar Association Journal. 68 
November 1982: 1370-72. 
Pressman, Steven. "The California Split." California Lawyer. 9 
August 1989: 19. 
Rehnqui st , Wi lliam H. "1989 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary," 1989. 
•
 
62 
Rehnquist, Wi 11 iam H. "1988 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary," 1988. 
Rehnquist, William H. "1987 Year-end Report on the Judiciary," 
1987. 
Rehnquist, William H. Address. Remarks of the Chief Justice. 
American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting. Denver, 6 February 
1989. 
Reynolds, William L. and William M. Richman. "Evaluation of 
Limited Publication in the United states Courts of Appeals: 
The Price of Reform." University of Chicago Law Review. 48 
(1981): 573-631. 
Rubin, Al vin B. "Bureaucrati zati on of the Federal Courts: Tens i on 
Between Justice and Efficiency." Notre Dame Lawyer. 55 
(1980): 645-656. 
Specter, Howard A. "Generic Justice." American Bar Association 
Journal. 68 November (1982): 1. 
stevens, John Paul. "Some Thoughts On Judicial Restraint." 
Judicature. 66 November 1982: 177-183. 
Stienstra, D. and J. Cecil, The Role of Staff Attorneys and Face­
to-Face Conferencing in Non-Argument Decisionmakinq. 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center, 1989. 
Surrency, Erwin C. History of the Federal Courts. New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1987. 
united States Constitution, Article III, Sections I and II. 
Vining, Joseph. "Justice, Bureaucracy and Legal Method." 
University of Michigan Law Review December 1981: 248-258. 
Wald, Patricia M. "Bureaucracy and the Courts." Yale Law Journal. 
92 (1983): 1478-1486. 
Wal d, Pat ri cia M. "The Probl em wi th the Courts: Black Robed 
Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?" Tri al . June 
1984: 28-34. 
Wasby, Stephen L. "The Study of Appellate Court Administration: 
The State of the Enterprise." Justice System Journal. 12 
November 1987: 119-142. 
Wheeler, Russell R. and Charles W. Nihan. Administering the 
Federal Judicial Circuits: A Survey of Chief Judges' 
Approaches and Procedures. Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Judicial Center: 1982. 
•
 
APPENDIX 
63
 
64 
Appendix A
 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
 
CIRCUITS 
Federal Circuit 
District of Columbia 
First Circuit 
Second Circuit 
Third Circuit 
Fourth Circuit 
Fifth Circuit 
Sixth Circuit 
Seventh Circuit 
Eight Circuit 
Ninth Circuit 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
United States 
District of Columbia 
Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island and Puerto Rico 
Connecticut, New York, 
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Delaware, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and the 
Virgin Islands 
Maryland, North 
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Carolina, Virginia, and 
West Virginia 
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Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio and Tennessee 
Illinois, Indiana 
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Arkansas, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota 
and South Dakota 
Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, Washington, 
Guam, and the Northern 
Marina Islands 
NUMBER OF JUDGES 
Twelve 
Twelve 
Six 
Thirteen 
Twelve 
Eleven 
Sixteen 
Fifteen 
Eleven 
Ten 
Twenty-Eight 
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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
(ctd. ) 
CIRCUITS GEOGRAPHICAL AREA NUMBER OF JUDGES 
Tenth Circuit Colorado, Kansas, New Ten 
Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Utah, and Wyoming 
Eleventh Circuit Alabama, Florida and Twelve 
Georgia 
, ..
 
* THE UNITED STATES COURT SYSTEM 
SUPREME COURT
 
OF THE UNITED STATES
 
I
 
I 
United States Court of Appeals 
12 Circuits 
I
 
I
 
United States Court 01 Appeals
 
lor the
 
Federal Circuit
 
I 
I I 
United States 
Tax Court 
Court of 
Veterans Appeals 
and various 
Administrative 
Agencies 
Federal Trade 
Commission 
National Labor 
Relations Board 
Immlgratlon and 
Naturallutlon . 
Service. etc. 
United States Uniled States United States United States 
District Courts District Courts Claims Court Court 01 
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